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Abstract: When in his Tanner lectures Stanley Cavell sets out to define Ordinary Lan-
guage Philosophy or – rather – to explain how it demarcates philosophy as such, he takes up 
psychoanalytic literary criticism in order to articulate the terms of this task. Yet the constitu-
tion of the ordinary, in Cavell, is never quite accessed from within psychoanalysis-cum-liter-
ature alone; instead, it takes another relation, that of psychoanalysis and literature to classical 
Hollywood, for Cavell to address the ordinary in terms of its constitution. I propose to discuss 
this complex using two films by Billy Wilder as a passageway to Cavell’s analytic procedure.
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    “Do you have a good ending for this thing?”  
        Billy Wilder  
   
1.
There is a distinction structural to Roland Barthes’ vision of American cinema.1 
It surfaces in his essay on Greta Garbo, when he analyzes Garbo in the register of lan-
guage, and then observes that her “singularity was of the order of the concept,” while 
the singularity of Audrey Hepburn “is of the order of the substance.”2 Put otherwise, 
“[t]he face of Garbo is an Idea, that of Hepburn, an Event.”3
1 The research for this essay was supported in part by funding from the Croatian Science Foundation (Project 
no. 1543).
2 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, London, MacMillan, 1972, 57.
3 Ibidem.
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I find Barthes’ comment suited to approaching Stanley Cavell’s philosophical 
engagement with cinema. Like Barthes, Cavell depends on associating cinema with 
a theory of language, to traverse this assemblage towards or alongside philosophy, 
where philosophy depends, for its rationale, on negotiating the relation of concept 
and event. That Barthes was similarly preoccupied by philosophy as the destination of 
his cinematic argument can be deduced from his remark, that “Garbo offered to one’s 
gaze a sort of Platonic Idea of the human creature”:4 the Platonism more explicit in 
the French original where the creature, and therefore the issue of creation, is cleansed 
of its humanity, as “une sorte d’idée platonicienne de la creature.”5
Both Barthes and Cavell perceive Garbo as critical to their line of reasoning. 
Barthes acknowledges this position nowhere so pointedly as when he takes the name 
given to Garbo, the Divine, not as a reference to “a superlative state of beauty,” but to 
“the essence of her corporeal person, descended from a heaven where all things are 
formed and perfected in the clearest light,” so that “her face was not to have any reality 
except that of its perfection, which was intellectual even more than formal.”6 
There is a threat in the concluding phrase, and it bears on the semiosis that Bar-
thes wants to promote. Garbo’s perfection, that is, is situated in the rift between form 
and intellect, as if intellect assumes, via Garbo, a critical overload unchecked by form 
(which may be one way of approaching the operation of the uncanny). Barthes can 
hardly contain this threat, and it keeps disrupting his piece on Garbo. It surfaces con-
spicuously when the sliding of the intellectual against the formal finds its equivalent in 
the sliding of Garbo’s sexuality, so that Garbo’s sexuality for Barthes is not the sign so 
much as a situation, the situation of intellect as excess. Thus Platonism, according to 
Barthes, “explains why her face is almost sexually undefined, without however leaving 
one in doubt.”7 Sexuality, in other words, serves to signal the ‘almost’ of Platonism, just 
as its leaving no one in doubt is premised on the doubt being signed away from the Pla-
tonic grasp of form. The crisis Garbo thus situates for philosophy is further explored by 
Barthes when he says that her face “represents that fragile moment when the cinema is 
about to draw an existential from an essential beauty […], when the clarity of the flesh as 
essence yields its place to a lyricism of Woman.”8 Again, Garbo as Woman seems to sig-
nify not the sex so much as the crisis occasioned by the intellect overriding the demands 
of the concepts like clarity or essence, which is to say the demands of concept to begin 
with. Significantly, this womanhood emerges in Barthes as lyricism, as if to suggest that 
it should be addressed in terms of voice rather than face, which is also how Barthes 
smuggles melodrama into his essay on Garbo, now honed into a critical instrument.
Barthes’ reading of Garbo adumbrates a similar argument in Cavell. When 
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intellectual overload that philosophy cannot fully accommodate precisely where phi-
losophy depends, for its rationale, on the form and format of its concepts. Accord-
ing to Cavell, the figure where this overload is most acutely articulated, in and for 
film, is the unknown woman of the Hollywood melodrama, the genre “an essential 
feature of which is a woman’s knowledge of the world against which the one she is 
offered appears second-rate.”9 That this other knowledge, offered to woman, entails 
the knowledge specific to philosophy can be discerned from Cavell’s remark, that “one 
form in which men must and must not hear the woman’s voice” is “that philosophical 
self-torment whose shape is skepticism, in which philosopher wants and wants not to 
exempt himself from the closet of privacy, wants and wants not to become intelligible, 
expressive, exposed.”10 Again, Garbo is crucial to his argument. She is “the greatest, or 
the most fascinating cinematic image on film of the unknown woman.”11 “It is in the 
figure of Garbo”, says Cavell, “that the idea of the woman’s unknownness most purely 
takes on its aspects of the desire of a man for a woman’s knowledge, as if to know 
what she knows may be taken as the answer to the question what a man after all wants 
of a woman and does not want after all.12” Given Cavell’s remark on the philosophical 
self-torment, the above reads also in the following terms: it is in the figure of Garbo 
that the idea of film’s unknownness most purely takes on its aspects of the desire of 
philosophy for film’s knowledge, as if to know what film knows may be taken as the an-
swer to the question what philosophy after all wants of film and does not want after all.
2.
This is how an interesting perspective opens on Cavell, in the position where 
he cultivates the threat to which Barthes merely alludes (the sliding of the intellectual 
against the formal, occasioned in or by classical Hollywood) into a full-blown crisis, 
to do with the constitution of philosophy. Cavell identifies this crisis as skepticism, 
and invariably relates it to an understanding of the ordinary, also to the ordinary lan-
guage philosophy. According to Cavell, skepticism refers to “the capacity, even desire, 
of ordinary language to repudiate itself, specifically to repudiate its power to word the 
world”,13 the capacity and the desire habitually shunned from philosophy, “as though 
philosophy is insisting on, driven to, some form of emptiness.”14 The threat of skepti-
cism therefore entails “the possibility that the world we see is not the world as it is, that 
9 Stanley Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy. Autobiographical Exercises, Cambridge, Mass. –London, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1994, 19.
10 Ibid, 132.
11 Stanley Cavell, Contesting Tears. The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman, Chicago–London, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996, 106.
12 Ibid, 2.
13 Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary. Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism, Chicago–London, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1988, 154.
14 Ibid, 163.
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the world is not humanly knowable, or sharable”15 – the inference Cavell traces back to 
Kant, but finds irresistible in the writings of Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Wittgenstein, 
says Cavell, points out not merely that “we, say, underestimate the role of the body and 
its behavior, but that we falsify it, I might even say, falsify the body: in philosophizing we 
turn the body into an impenetrable integument.”16 He then continues: “It is as though 
I, in philosophizing, want this metamorphosis, want to place the mind beyond reach, 
want to get the body inexpressive, and at the same time find that I cannot quite want to, 
want to without reserve. Wittgenstein is interested in this peculiar strain of philosophy 
(it may be philosophy’s peculiar crime) to want exactly the impossible, the thought tor-
turing itself, language repudiating itself. In Wittgenstein’s philosophizing he seeks the 
source of this torture and repudiation in language – what is in language that makes this 
seem necessary, and what about language makes this possible.”17
This is why Cavell detects “[a]n urgent methodological issue of ordinary lan-
guage philosophy” to be “that of accounting for the fact that we are the victims of the 
very words of which we are at the same time the masters; victims and masters of the 
fact of words”; he adds however that it is “the issue about which this cast of thought 
is philosophically at its weakest.”18 It is the weakness that bears on the constitution 
of the ordinary, for philosophy, because the ordinary and the everyday are therefore 
to be accessed only in terms of oddity and uncanniness, as “a horrified vision of or-
dinariness.”19 Indeed, Cavell hails Heidegger for his interest in “the surrealism of the 
habitual” and Thoreau for his “vision of the oddness of our everyday,” just as he iden-
tifies Wittgenstein’s originality in taking “the drift toward skepticism as the discovery 
of the everyday,” “as if what philosophy is dissatisfied by is inherently the everyday.”20 
Consequently, “the everyday is not merely one topic among others that philosophers 
might take an interest in, but one that a philosopher is fated to an interest in so long 
as he or she seeks a certain kind of response to the threat of skepticism.”21 Cavell’s 
appreciation of cinema is in line with this. “Film is a moving image of skepticism,” he 
says: “not only is there a reasonable possibility, it is a fact that here our normal senses 
are satisfied of reality while reality does not exist – even, alarmingly, because it does 
not exist, because viewing it is all it takes.”22 This is why “film’s drama, or the latent 
anxiety in viewing its drama, lies in its persistent demonstration that we do not know 
what our conviction in reality turns upon,” so that yielding “to the familiar wish to 
15 Stanley Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness. The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 
Harvard University Press, 1981, 271.




20 Ibid, 154, 169–171.
21 Ibid, 171.
22 Stanley, Cavell, The World Viewed. Reflections on the Ontology of Film, Cambridge,  Mass.–London, Harvard 
University Press, 179, 188–189.
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speak of film as providing in general an ‘illusion of reality’ would serve to disguise 
this latent anxiety.”23
It is for this reason that the ordinary language philosophy, in Cavell, targets 
principally loss, mourning and the uncanny as the tenors of its coherence. Because 
“[t]he everyday is what we cannot but aspire to, since it appears to us as lost to us,” 
Cavell insists, “accepting the everyday, the ordinary, is not a given but a task.”24 It 
follows that “I lose the world in every impulse to philosophy,” he says; the world there-
fore “must be regained every day, in repetition, regained as gone.”25 Hence Cavell’s re-
peated invocations of “Emerson’s and Thoreau’s ‘silent melancholy’ and ‘quiet desper-
ation,’” especially of Walden where Thoreau most acutely “proposes human existence 
as the finding of ecstasy in the knowledge of loss.”26
3.
What thereby emerges in Cavell is a peculiar drift toward psychoanalysis. He 
acknowledges this drift, repeatedly, and claims it as critical to the ordinary language 
philosophy. Indeed, when he proposes to analyze the ordinary in terms of uncanni-
ness, in the Tanner lectures, Cavell starts with a critical reading of Freud’s essay “The 
Uncanny” and all but appropriates Freud for philosophy. To be sure, he dutifully notes 
that Freud is reluctant to embrace philosophy for psychoanalysis, and vice versa, but 
he engages this reluctance as psychoanalysis would engage a symptom. In Cavell’s 
words, “Freud’s repeated dissociation of psychoanalysis from philosophy” should be 
addressed as a dissociation “in which Freud seems to me to be protesting too much, as 
though he knows his own uncertainty about how, even whether, psychoanalysis and 
philosophy can be distinguished without fatal damage to each of them.”27 Moreover, 
Cavell suggests that Freud’s identification of the uncanny with “the threat of castra-
tion” is flawed, because Freud thus occludes that about the uncanny which hinges 
on the ordinary and on the threat of skepticism (skepticism as threat). Put differ-
ently, rather than uncovering the raison of psychoanalysis, as Freud would have it, 
castration anxiety seems to be the symptom of psychoanalysis, in the position where 
psychoanalysis fails to acknowledge its affinity with philosophy.28 On the other hand, 
Cavell finds no such flaw in Freud’s approach to mourning, which he affirms as a 
23 Ibid, 189.
24 Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary…, op. cit., 171.
25 Ibid, 172.
26 Ibid, 155, 171.
27 Ibid, 156.
28 That Cavell is pressing psychoanalysis into a symptom wherever he perceives it to be dodging the threat of 
skepticism can be evinced from his bold casting of Freud into the role of Ophelia – when he says that “Freud 
seems to be protesting too much.” It is the casting that says a great deal about Cavell’s own argument, in which 
Freud as Ophelia assumes the position that Cavell elsewhere assigns to the unknown woman, while Cavell 
could be identified as Hamlet (of or for philosophy).
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proper philosophical response to loss. When he remarks that “the world must be re-
gained every day, in repetition, regained as gone,” Cavell notes “that Freud too thinks 
of mourning as an essentially repetitive exercise,” so that “[l]earning mourning may 
be the achievement of a lifetime.”29 Equally, he welcomes Freud’s and Breuer’s insight 
into hysteria when, in Contesting Tears, he analyzes the overwhelming responsiveness 
to the world on the part of the unknown women in Hollywood melodrama.
As a result, psychoanalysis too suffers a kind of reconstitution in Cavell. His 
seemingly random forays at Freud reveal that his preference lies with pre-1920s psy-
choanalysis, the one before Freud’s discovery of the death drive, as if psychoanalysis 
based in the death drive had little to say about the constitution of the ordinary and 
the threat it organizes for philosophy. Since the death drive entails that the logic of 
metaphor be granted analytic preeminence, it follows that metaphor fails to capture 
the tenor of Cavell’s argument on the ordinary, and that a figural inflection is called 
for if one is to engage it.
4.
Barthes again provides a conduit into Cavell, when he slips away from met-
aphor in his discussion of Garbo. This happens when Barthes distinguishes Garbo 
from Audrey Hepburn not in terms of an opposition, but from within an inflection 
Hepburn traverses in this semiotic operation: an inflection Barthes describes as Hep-
burn’s peculiar susceptibility to morphology. In Barthes’ words, “the face of Audrey 
Hepburn […] is individualized, not only because of its peculiar thematics (woman as 
child, woman as kitten) but also because of her person, of an almost unique specifi-
cation of the face, which has nothing of the essence left in it, but is constituted by an 
infinite complexity of morphological functions.”30 Morphology in this context evokes 
the figural logic of metonymy, in the position where metaphor best captures Barthes’ 
understanding of concept and essence, or, indeed, of concept as essence. By extension, 
metonymy captures the semiotic operation that Barthes associates with the Event and 
that Cavell associates with the ordinary.31
29 Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary…, op. cit., 172. Cavell’s perspective on Freudian mourning dovetails 
significantly with the one Jacques Derrida later elaborates in Specters of Marx (1993). Cavell notes this affinity in 
Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow and remarks that it occasions a certain nervousness in him (Stanley Cavell, 
Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, Cambridge, Mass.–London, Harvard University Press, 2005, 108–109), in the 
positions where Derrida’s residual messianism curbs the logic of loss. Derrida, on the other hand, omits acknowl-
edging his philosophical debt to Freud’s mourning in his book on Marx – an omission more symptomatic perhaps 
than Cavell’s acknowledged nervousness when the unsettled score is thus brought to light. 
30 Roland Barthes, op. cit., 57.
31 Barthes’ description of Hepburn anticipates Deleuze’s and Guattari’s interest in devenir-femme, the woman as 
a spectacle of becoming: “a molecular woman” who does not as yet yield the imaginary of organs. This is why 
the girl, not the woman, best describes this femininity: “[t]he girl is certainly not defined by virginity; she is 
defined by a relation of movement and rest.” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, Minneapolis–London, University of Minnesota Press, 1987, 276.
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Cavell’s perspective on Audrey Hepburn corresponds to Barthes’. If Garbo is 
“the greatest, or the most fascinating cinematic image on film of the unknown wom-
an,” Hepburn is listed among the actresses who process this cinematic figure away 
from concept and into morphology.32 Cavell classes her with Carole Lombard, Rosa-
lind Russell and Katharine Hepburn, who “convey an intelligence that animates their 
presence.”33 He then proceeds to attribute the ‘magic’ of Audrey Hepburn in Billy 
Wilder’s Sabrina not to her so much as to her relating to Humphrey Bogart.34 Her 
intelligence is not meant to engross or captivate, like Garbo’s, so that the threat Garbo 
puts forward is all but contained by its evolution into a concept or essence. Instead, 
Hepburn serves to morphologize the threat as it were, away from herself and into a 
metonymic grid, until film, not merely one of its figures, is exposed as a threatening 
morphology. Which is also how film is irreducibly pressed into a moving image of 
skepticism: precisely the position that Cavell wants for it, and for philosophy. 
This in turn maps an impasse in Cavell: why the fascination with Garbo if Hep-
burn brings cinema to the conditions that Cavell wants for philosophy? To address 
this impasse, recourse to Hollywood cinema seems proper and necessary, more pre-
cisely, to two Hepburn films directed by Billy Wilder: Sabrina (1954) and Love in the 
Afternoon (1957). The fact that Cavell himself refers to Sabrina is significant, because 
it testifies to his derivation of Audrey Hepburn from Wilder.  
Cavell’s passing reference points to a complicated cinematic order that Wilder 
has arranged around Hepburn, the order singularly suited to a discussion of Cavell’s 
philosophy of film. Firstly, Wilder authored the Hollywood narratives both for Garbo 
and for Audrey Hepburn: he co-wrote Ernst Lubitsch’s Ninotchka (1939), the film tai-
lored to Garbo, as well as his own Hepburn films. It follows that Wilder mobilizes the 
Hollywood presences pf Garbo and Hepburn into an assemblage – that he is critical 
to promoting them into a metonymy. Love in the Afternoon is particularly interest-
ing, because its story, as well as its directing style, owe a great deal to Ninotchka, so 
that Wilder’s Hepburn in this film is in fact made to respond to the world created for 
Garbo.
Secondly, in both Sabrina and Love in the Afternoon Hepburn galvanizes her 
male co-stars into a cinematic presence unsheltered by the genres where their cin-
ematic meaning was previously defined and regulated, so that their performance in 
Wilder is based in their baring themselves to film as if for the first time; this is also 
how film in Wilder is being bared to its own conditions. In Sabrina, Bogart is exposed 
to the world of comedy; Wilder is clearly playing with the proposition that the Holly-
wood noir with its sinister resonance, which has profiled Bogart for cinema, is actually 
32 That Garbo to Cavell designates concept, even more acutely than she does to Barthes, can be inferred from 
Cavell’s comment that “Garbo has generalized“ the woman’s unknownness in classical Hollywood “beyond hu-
man doubting [...], so that the sense of failure to know her, of her being beyond us (say visibly absent), is itself 
the proof of her existence.” Stanley Cavell, Contesting Tears…, op. cit., 106.
33 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed. Reflections on the Ontology of Film, Cambridge, Mass.–London, Harvard 
University Press, 1979, 51.
34 Ibid, 80.
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a protective formula compared to the threat of Bogart shedding this protection and 
baring himself to film.35 The same is true of Gary Cooper in Love in the Afternoon. 
The staple of the American Western as the ‘strong silent type’, Cooper is exposed not 
merely to comedy but to the mad pace of its conversation, which is reminiscent of the 
Hollywood screwball tradition. As a result, Cooper signals residual madness in this 
comedy’s flair for language; this in turn is how the language of this comedy is pushed 
towards psychoanalysis as well as towards Cavell.36
Finally, one can hardly propose a better description of Wilder’s cinema than the 
one Cavell proposes for philosophy, when he identifies its task to be a response “to the 
fantastic in what human beings will accustom themselves to, call this the surrealism of 
the habitual” and “to the necessity, and the lack of necessity, in the sense of the human 
as inherently strange, say unstable, its quotidian as forever fantastic”37  – which is also 
how Cavell understands the raison of the Freudian uncanny. Wilder’s films, that is, are 
compulsively about acting and role-playing; tellingly, they end when they arrive at the 
position where this compulsion shows as irreducible to make-believe, or to belief for 
that matter, and when surrealism itself has been espoused as habit.
5.
There is another reason why Wilder’s Hepburn is symptomatic for a reading of 
Cavell: because Wilder cast her repeatedly as a Cavellian unknown woman. Although 
Sabrina and Love in the Afternoon are comedies, both are premised on the assumption 
that Audrey Hepburn, like the Cavellian women of the Hollywood melodrama, mo-
bilizes the narratives of the two films by successfully translating her unhappiness into 
unknownness: the unknownness which takes on the aspect of the desire of a man for 
a woman’s knowledge, as if to know what she knows may be taken as the answer to the 
question what a man after all wants of a woman and does not want after all. Moreover, 
both Wilder films with Hepburn mobilize her as the woman whose narrative func-
tion corresponds to the narrative function of the women in E. T. A. Hoffmann’s The 
35 “‘Bogart’ means ‘the figure created in a given set of films’“ says Cavell: “After The Matese Falcon we know a 
new star, only distantly a person.“ Ibid, 28.
36 Wilder was aware of Cooper’s having accumulated the iconicity of the Western; he described this visual con-
taminant as a “superimposition” which had lost him some of the audiences (Cameron Crowe, Conversations with 
Billy Wilder, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, 91). Cooper was important to Wilder in yet another way: his role 
in Love in the Afternoon was possibly also a tribute to Lubitsch. Wilder co-wrote for Lubitsch The Bluebeard’s 
Eighth Wife (1938), a comedy with Cooper in a similar role. (Wilder’s film resounds with another Lubitsch Coo-
per, the earlier one of Design for Living, of 1933, not least where Wilder’s Cooper invokes the pre-code sexuality 
of Lubitsch’s comedy.) That Wilder appreciated Cooper for his sexual flair, united with an elegant linguistic per-
formance, see Cameron Crowe, op. cit., 146. That the language of Wilder’s comedy, in the scenes to which Cooper 
was decisive, was perceived as excessive and unwarranted, see ibid, 190–191. Interestingly, Wilder wanted Cary 
Grant for the roles that eventually went to Bogart and Cooper, just as Lubitsch wanted Cary Grant for the male 
lead in Ninotchka, the role that eventually went to Melvyn Douglas. (See ibid.) This too signals that these films 
work as an assemblage, that the logic of their coherence resides in metonymy and morphology.
37 Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary…, op. cit., 154.
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Sandman – the story that Freud engaged to explain the uncanny, and that Cavell then 
employed to translate Freud’s the uncanny into the ordinary. 
Indeed, both films climax when Hepburn tips the narrative into ‘the surrealism 
of the habitual’. In Sabrina, she reinvents herself, from a charming American girl next 
door into a charming woman from Paris, in order to attract the notice of the suave 
and debonair William Holden; yet she ends up with the grim Humphrey Bogart who 
appreciates the surrealism of her reinvention only to fall prey to a similar reconstitu-
tion himself, for her, until the two of them together can no longer yield the everyday 
untainted by surrealism – call it the Cavellian uncanny, or the threat of skepticism. In 
Love in the Afternoon, she does the same to Gary Cooper: she reinvents herself from 
a Paris girl next door into a woman from Paris, in order to renew the notice of the 
suave, debonair Gary Cooper (who in many ways repeats the role of Sabrina’s William 
Holden), until he has reconstituted himself into a Humphrey Bogart. Both films con-
clude with the crisis of reconstitution thus affecting their leading men – call it their 
reconstitution into the ordinary as the uncanny. Still, this crisis is inaugurated by the 
critical melodramatic/ melancholy episode of their Hepburn. In Sabrina, her recon-
stitution is preceded by a lengthy episode of her attempted suicide following lovelorn 
melancholia; in Love in the Afternoon, by a lengthy episode of lovelorn melancholia 
preceded by Sabrina’s suicide attempt.38 
This is important, because Wilder’s Hepburn comedies are otherwise consistent 
with the Hollywood comedies of remarriage. Cavell privileges the remarriage comedy 
as the platform from where to address skepticism as a sociopolitical issue. If “philo-
sophical skepticism” could be “cast as a wish to transgress the naturalness of human 
speech,” he says, his discussion of the remarriage comedy “shifts the wish to trans-
gression from what might be called the natural to the social plane.”39 Put differently, 
if “human knowledge” is equated with the capacity “to use language”, then “the will 
to knowledge and the will to marriage may be seen to require analogous limitations 
in order to perform their work of social constitution, limitations that combat their 
tendencies to privacy or their fantasies of privacy.”40  
This is why Cavell’s discussion of the remarriage comedy goes hand in hand 
with his interest in conversation: because conversation, according to Cavell, is the po-
litical use of language par excellence, mobilizing  the logic of contract, always also as 
social contract, just as it designates the use of language that is definitive to marriage. 
38 Again, Wilder shares this strategy with Lubitsch. In his (later) comedies Lubitsch repeatedly inscribed into 
his heroines the threat of suicide, which then went into the making of the happy end. See Alenka Zupančič 
Žerdin, “Kaj je ‘Cluny Brown’?”, in: Ivana Novak and Jela Krečić, (eds.), Zadeva Lubitsch, Ljubljana, Slovenska 
kinoteka–Društvo za teoretsko psihoanalizo, 2013, 179, and Tatjana Jukić, “Film, politika, psihoanaliza: slučaj 
Lubitsch”, in: Ivan Majić, Andrea Milanko and Ana Tomljenović (eds.), Dosezi psihoanalize. Kniževnost, izved-
bene umjetnosti, film i kultura, Zagreb, Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 2015, 90. Furthermore, in both 
his Hepburn comedies Wilder engages the narrative premise of Max Ophüls’ Letter from an Unknown Woman 
(1948): that the man meets the woman he has already met as an unknown woman. (Cavell finds this narrative 
premise critical to his discussion of  the Hollywood melodrama.)
39 Stanley Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness…, op. cit., 74.
40 Ibidem.
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(Hence Cavell’s repeated references to Milton’s understanding of marriage in terms of 
conversation – to the understanding of marriage as “a thirst for talk.”)41 Equally, this 
is why Cavell is interested not in marriage so much as in remarriage of these com-
edies: because remarriage, rather than marriage, signifies the willingness to reenter 
conversation against all odds and thus affirm the value of contract and, with it, the 
value of “the democratic social bond.”42 In addition, conversation is how these com-
edies principally intervene into cinema, with the advent of the talkies in the 1930s 
and the 1940s, until a reconstitution of film itself is effected. Cavell rightly notes that 
these comedies do not merely feature conversation but are obsessed with it – that they 
exhibit a thirst for conversation similar to the one that Milton attributes to marriage43 
– which is also how film shows to be obsessed with its potential for reconstitution. 
Because the reconstitution of film is effected through conversation, the character of 
this reconstitution shows as political; because film is a moving image of skepticism, 
cinematic skepticism is how philosophy most intimately encounters the political.
6.
There is another remarkable aspect of the Hollywood remarriage comedies. The 
fact that they yield a coherent cinematic template and invite to be analyzed together, 
as an assemblage or a collective, is taken by Cavell to mean that there is a structural 
quality to their insight into contract, conversation and remarriage. Consequently, the 
knowledge thus generated in Hollywood is acknowledged by Cavell to be relative to 
the political and the philosophical project of America or, put otherwise, to America 
as the project in which philosophy is indivisible from politics – which is also how 
America is a laboratory of politics in and for modernity. (The title of Cavell’s book 
on the Hollywood comedy of remarriage, Pursuits of Happiness, is a straightforward 
derivation from the American Declaration of Independence.) Equally significant is 
the implication that knowledge thus obtained is morphological and metonymic in 
character, insofar as morphology and metonymy determine the logic of coherence of 
the comedies thus assembled into a collective. 
Again, Wilder exemplifies and challenges this grouping in Cavell. His two Hep-
burn comedies are companion pieces, whose coherence depends on a variety of mor-
phological and metonymic contacts. By virtue of this companionship their focus on 
marriage is always also a focus on remarriage, before the fact as it were. Yet remarriage 
informs Wilder’s narratives consistently as a threat, and is comparable actually to how 
Cavell conceives of the uncanny. Sabrina opens with William Holden, as David Larrabee, 
promising marriage casually and serially: the film opens with marriage as remarriage 
to begin with, but foregrounds the irreducible violence and violability of promise that 
41 See ibid, 87, 146, 152.
42 Ibid, 33.
43 Ibid, 146.
 DISCUSSIONS  | ART+MEDIA
103
remarriage thus brings into play. Holden’s script here is the one of Don Juan, whose lin-
guistic performance Shoshana Felman compares to that of J. L. Austin, and thus relates 
to the heart of the ordinary language philosophy. (Interestingly, when describing Aus-
tin’s performance, Felman, like Cavell, insists on the commerce between the language 
of philosophy and the language of psychoanalysis. Unlike Cavell, Felman espouses the 
post-1920 psychoanalysis, the one reconstituted around the death drive, and insists on 
metaphor as the figural logic appropriate to analyzing Austin. Both Cavell and Felman 
however zero in on marriage as the conduit to the ordinary language philosophy. After 
all, Cavell wrote a foreword to the second English edition of Felman’s book.) 
According to Felman, the Don Juan script is eventually contained when the 
paternal figure, associated equally with law and with metaphor, puts an end to serial 
promises of marriage (and therefore to remarriage). In Wilder, this script is contained 
only if its woman remains unknown, cultivating the uncanny and the threat of skep-
ticism, until she has reduced the leading man to the operation of this threat – until 
the man has been reduced to a philosophical self-torment, as Cavell calls it. To be 
sure, fathers do surface in Wilder’s Hepburn films, but only to dissolve as instances of 
authority. They are reduced to children or kitten, by Hepburn, which is what she does 
to her lovers too (to Bogart and Cooper), precisely in the instances where they could 
have assumed paternalist authority over her, being markedly older and wiser. 
The eventual (re)marriage of this man and this woman, thus secured through 
the woman’s unfailing cultivation of the uncanny and the man’s reduction to philo-
sophical self-torment, departs indeed away from the law and into the contract (the 
contract Cavell hails as the vehicle of America’s politics and philosophy), but the 
contract now exposed as based in the fantasy and the raison of masochism. Gilles 
Deleuze, who shares Cavell’s philosophical affinity for film and for America, claims 
that the contract between the man and the woman is essential to the fantasy of mas-
ochism. The contract is needed to regulate the relation in which the woman secures 
the threat and the torment; the contract departs away from the law because the wom-
an assumes the prerogatives of fatherhood (punishment, cruelty, inaccessibility), but 
remains sexed, which is also how she does away with paternalism and the law implicit 
to it, while the contract is assigned the work of regulation.44 The man in this relation 
44 Cavell emphasizes the importance of the father-daughter relationship in the remarriage comedies, just as 
he maintains that this relationship is erased from the melodrama of the unknown woman. Deleuze in turn 
provides the script where the Cavellian negation of fatherhood could be reclaimed as a feature of masoch-
ism. See Gilles Deleuze, Coldness and Cruelty, New York, Zone Books, 2006. If Deleuze’s masochism is not 
properly Freudian in its explication, it nonetheless owes to psychoanalysis: Deleuze’s presentation is based in 
a critical reading of Freud (just as Cavell’s explication of the uncanny is based in a critical reading of Freud). 
This seems to be of a piece with Cavell’s affinity for Freud before the 1920s, as if Freud’s masochism, typical 
of the post-Todestrieb psychoanalysis, needs to be reclaimed at a remove from the death drive. Moreover, the 
phantasmal character of Deleuzian masochism points to affinity with the spectral character of cinema and all 
but adumbrates it; the two visual regimes intersect in the position where Cavell welcomes cinema into his dis-
cussion of the ordinary as the uncanny, “the moving image of skepticism”. Finally, the phantasmal character of 
masochism tallies with the compulsive role-playing in Wilder’s films – the compulsion irreducible to belief or 
make-believe, until surrealism has been espoused as habit.
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is thereby liberated from the law even as he pursues the limits of its language and its 
reason, exposing himself to revolutionary education and reconstitution: the opera-
tion which Deleuze perceives to be critical philosophically and politically.45 In turn, 
the analytic pursuit thus invested in masochism corresponds, almost uncannily, to 
the pursuit Cavell identifies in Wittgenstein’s philosophy – when he associates with 
Wittgenstein the wish to place the mind beyond reach, and to get body inexpressive 
(without quite wanting to without reserve), which is how the thought is brought to 
torture itself and the language to repudiate itself. Like Deleuze’s masochist, Cavell’s 
Wittgenstein seeks the source of torture and repudiation in language, the implication 
being that liberation is the ultimate ambition of this philosophy – the condition that 
Cavell, symptomatically, associates with weakness.46 
The raison implicit to Deleuzian masochism corresponds also to the structure 
of Cavell’s philosophical investment in cinema, nowhere so pointedly perhaps as in 
Deleuze’s nuanced appropriation of woman. While Freud sacrifices the woman of the 
masochist fantasy for a metaphor of fatherhood (so that she becomes expendable, a 
father substitute), Deleuze recovers the woman of masochism in her uncanniness, 
as if to pave the way to Cavell’s configurations of gender and sexuality. Deleuze, like 
Cavell, affirms this woman as a function of language; she contributes to masochism 
primarily as a figure of orality, in a zone of resonance which is not unlike the conver-
sational situation in Cavell. Furthermore, the zone of resonance, or of conversation, 
where this woman regulates the fantasy and the raison of masochism, is described by 
Deleuze as morphological in character. This is why Cavell’s decision to split the wom-
an of the masochist relation, into the talker of the remarriage comedy and the isolated 
unknown stranger of melodrama, is critical. By explaining the unknown woman as 
the negation of the talking one,47 Cavell fails to appreciate the metonymic and the 
morphological logic of this world. His incision of negation into this woman is an 
attempt to reintroduce the raison of metaphor into the arrangement that depends on 
renouncing metaphor and law; this in turn injures Cavell’s own initial explanation of 
the ordinary as the uncanny and, by extension, the groundwork of his philosophy.48 
That the injury covers up for unacknowledged masochism can be evinced from 
Cavell’s reaction to Felman, whose approach to Austin’s speech act theory, as noted, 
45 In both Wilder’s Hepburn films, especially in Sabrina, contract is first introduced as a vehicle of the capitalist 
reason, with America as its hotbed, so that the marriage contract follows as secondary to it. Hepburn however 
serves to sex the contract away from the capitalist everyday and into its uncanny, which is also how she exposes 
capitalism to be a sexual fantasy, a veritable imaginary.
46 The torture that Cavell attributes to Wittgenstein resonates in Cavell’s decision to describe his own analytic 
encounter with the woman’s voice as the philosophical self-torment.
47 Stanley Cavell, Contesting Tears…, op. cit., 6.
48 Deleuze acknowledges a similar contact of the ordinary and the uncanny, as integral to masochism, when he 
identifies ritual, with its delirious and hallucinatory aspects, as the destination of the masochist fantasy. Also, 
similarly to Cavell’s intervention into the Freudian uncanny, Deleuze suggests that castration in this world is 
misplaced, possibly redundant (Gilles Deleuze, Coldness and Cruelty, op. cit., 100). Finally, Deleuze points out 
that humor is integral to masochism, which is also how to relate it to the humor of the remarriage comedy.
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is based in metaphor and the paternal principle.49 To Felman’s assertion, that she was 
seduced by Austin, Cavell replies by “identifying her speech act also as demanding a 
response to her pleasure.”50 “That is a cruelty,” Cavell continues, until Felman has been 
reconfigured into the demanding woman of Deleuzian masochism: the maneuver 
Cavell explicitly associates with “perversity”.51 That he is fully part to the (contractual) 
logic this implies can be inferred from the concluding sentence of his foreword: “I 
share further the sense […] that philosophy’s cruelty is inherently seductive, or said 
otherwise, that philosophers have to bear the recognition that in their defense of rea-




If there is a good ending to this thing, I propose to situate it in the challenge 
Deleuze presents to my argument. His masochism ensues from an insight into Aus-
tro-Hungarian literature. Cavell on the other hand is the philosopher of America and, 
by extension, of democracy as it is inflected in its language. He repeatedly situates his 
entry into philosophy around his acquisition of this language, emphasizing that this 
was not the language of his father or of his parents, as if understanding America is 
based in linguistic disinheritance – hence perhaps the uncanny as the ordinary of this 
language, also as the precondition of democracy. What this language accommodates, 
consequently, is precisely the event of disinheritance, or disinheritance as the event 
forever eluding the philosophical safety of a concept. 
Disinheritance haunts Cavell’s philosophical memoir, titled aptly Little Did I 
Know: the haunting caught up in the timbre that Cavell traces back to his mother’s 
Austro-Hungarian immigrant history, from which he has adopted and adapted his 
family name. Symptomatically, Cavell returns, repeatedly, to the importance of music 
in his evolution as a philosopher: the music he inherited from his mother’s family just 
as his American language was securing him disinheritance and emancipation. Music, 
which is inalienable to and in language even as it constitutes its outside, thus emerges 
in Cavell as the critical point of entry into America and philosophy alike: the point of 
entry resurfacing in Cavell not only when he discusses music, but also when he keeps 
49 “The paternal promise is (...) a promise of metaphor,” says Felman (Shoshana Felman, The Scandal of the 
Apeaking Body. Don Juan with J. L. Austin, or Seduction in Two Languages, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 
2003, 24).
50 Stanley Cavell, “Foreword”, in: Shoshana Felman, The Scandal of the Speaking Body. Don Juan with J. L. Austin, 
or Seduction in Two Languages, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003, xxi.
51 Ibid, xxi–xxi.
52 Ibid, xxi. When Cavell writes that “[i]n Derrida’s heritage we ‘cannot’ truly escape from the tradition of phi-
losophy; in mine we cannot truly escape to philosophy” (Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary…, op. cit., 
174–175), he seems to be attributing to Derrida the intellectual groundwork of (Deleuzian) sadism, as he is 
assuming, for himself, the raison of masochism.
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addressing the woman’s voice, or conversation as its flip side, or the reconstitution 
of cinema after the advent of sound. If music in Cavell corresponds to the scope of 
woman in Deleuzian masochism and the orality of this woman, it corresponds also 
to Deleuze’s appreciation of the Austro-Hungarian linguistic makeup, whose many 
metonymizing languages present philosophy with a challenge similar to that of Amer-
ica.53 Cavell acknowledges this position in Deleuze, and in his own writing, when 
he takes up a comment by Henry James, about the Eastern European immigrants 
swarming the early twentieth-century New York: “What, oh, what again, were he and 
his going to make of us?”54 Cavell duly notes that “making something of America” 
is “at once a matter of interpreting it and a matter of changing it.”55 What he implies, 
unwittingly, is that Austria-Hungary engages the American pursuit of happiness as a 
promise of masochism – the implication already there in his espousal of Vienna as the 
“city that fashioned Wittgenstein”56 and his commitment to the Austro-Hungarian 
narrative of Ophüls’ Letter from an Unknown Woman, not to mention his lifelong 
philosophical interest in Freud.
A good ending requires also a concluding note on Wilder. An immigrant to 
America born in the eastern expanses of the Austro-Hungarian empire, formerly an 
aspiring Viennese journalist who had visited Freud in 19 Berggasse for an interview 
(Freud refused and showed him the door), Wilder acquired English and became one 
of the most important scriptwriters and directors of classical Hollywood. Significant-
ly, in both his Hepburn films, Hepburn is a European import to America; she infuses 
the language of America with a peculiar music, so that her language is the one she 
shares and does not share with the American men to whom she proves threatening, as 
if the threat – her coming at them as the uncanny from the heart of their everyday – 
resides in this musical inflection, in the oral excess preying on their understanding.57 
53 It could be argued that Deleuze’s presentation of masochism and his understanding of minor literature con-
stitute an assemblage. 
54 Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, op. cit., 105.
55 Ibidem.
56 Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary…, op. cit.,  1988, 181.
57 As significantly, Wilder wrote and directed his Hepburn as metonymic to music in film: the music he care-
fully tagged with the tidbits of Austro-Hungariana (references to Viennese operetta and Hungarian Gypsy 
quartets…). See Cameron Crowe, op. cit., 107 about Wilder’s structural engagement with music in his films.
